A New Bundeswehr
German Military Must Fit Europes Global Profile / By Hans-Peter Bartels, a member of the Bundestags Defense Committee and Social Democratic Party
Beitrag in "Defense News" (1/2004)
Fourteen months after the publication of the U.S. National Security Strategy, the European Council has agreed on its own security philosophy: "A secure Europe in a better world."
While the U.S. paper categorically states, "The United States possesses unprecedented - and unequalled - strength and influence in the world", the Europeans calmly added this perspective: "The conclusion of the Cold War has left the United States in a dominant position as a military actor; no other country or group of countries comes close to its capability. Nevertheless, no single country is able to tackle todays complex problems entirely on its own."
This neatly summarizes how Europe and Germany are changing and facing a changed world. Bloc-to-bloc confrontation has been replaced by the risks of proliferation, the dangers of terrorism and the crisis zones on the peripheries of the continent. But Europe is now a global player, and Germany must decide what role it will play, how loosely or tightly it will be bound to broader European strategy, and how to shape its military accordingly.
Even Henry Kissingers well-known derisive question about who or what "Europe" was - which phone he should ring - has, for the moment, been answered: Javier Solana, the high representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy and author of the EU Security Strategy.
So which strategic aims should we pursue as Germans and Europeans to contribute to a secure future? European integration will increase our security, but also pushes our borders closer to crisis zones. That means we must cooperate with neighbouring states to the east and in the southern Mediterranean to see they are governed sensibly. In the Balkans, tardy but determined efforts by NATO and the European Union resolved civil wars. Today, we are stabilizing these states and bringing them closer to Europe.
Another European policy objective must be a willingness to ensure, by military means if necessary, that international rules are actually enforced. The core of this norms-based world order is the United Nations charter. For us as Europeans, NATO remains the critical strategic link between the European Union and the United States. But each must be able to take independent action if necessary. Along with NATO, these three entities can be extremely efficient strategic partners, as efforts to bring peace and security to the Balkans have demonstrated.
The new threats are not static. Failing to address them only increases the danger. Often, the first line of defense will be abroad. We must be prepared to take action before a crisis erupts and to more effectively coordinate our aid programs and development activities, and our military and civil capabilities. This means the future 25 states of the European Union must more efficiently use the 160 billion euros ($203 billion) they will spend in this area, and focus on merged and joint resources and capabilities to cut costs and create new capabilities. We cannot, and do not intend, to match the $400 billion the United States spends on its armed forces, and we are not competing with them for military power or prestige.
And since we can scarcely tackle any global problems alone, Europe must reinforce its strategic ties not only to the United States, but also Russia, Japan, China, India and Latin America. The EU Security Strategy forms the political framework for German security policy. Germany needs to debate whether this European umbrella is sufficient or whether Germany must define its own national interests and state explicitly where and how it wants to become engaged around the world, and where it does not. The new Defence Policy Guidelines are a first step in this direction.
The fundamentally changed security environment calls for a changed Army. In the summer of 2000, then-Defense Minister Rudolph Scharping initiated a comprehensive transformation of the Bundeswehr into a force primarily shaped for crisis prevention and reaction outside Germany. Following Sept. 11, 2001, Defense Minister Peter Struck further developed these reforms. Bundeswehr priorities need to be systematically defined in areas vital to missions abroad so it can adapt to limited resources and shift military investments when necessary.
Structural changes also are coming to the Bundeswehr. Struck outlined future developments in January, including reducing the armed forces by another 30,000 personnel to 250,000 by 2010, and division of the Bundeswehr into three categories. The reaction forces (35,000 service personnel) are to be deployed in peace enforcement operations. This requires standoff capability, precision, rapid mobility and the capacity to carry out networked operations. The stabilization forces (70,000 service personnel), with modern equipment and a particular focus on leadership ability, logistics, staying power and self-protection, also need to be able to confront asymmetric warfare. They will be deployed to separate parties to a conflict and monitor cease-fires. The remaining institutions and units of the Bundeswehr make up the support forces.
Germany must set priorities with regard to its military capabilities and increase cooperation with its partners in NATO and the European Union. Because our operations will always be multinational, its contribution within the framework of joint structures must be the very best. Our neighbors are implementing similar concepts. Tomorrows Bundeswehr does not need to be able to do everything, but must be able to do many things better than today.
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